Firmware Testing

Online Tests

When a firmware format is set in the metainfo.xml file various tests are performed on the firmware by the LVFS. This includes checking file headers, magic numbers or CRCs for the chosen update protocol.

The update protocol can be changed on the LVFS website, and the correct tests will be run automatically. Firmware that has unresolved test failures cannot be pushed to the testing or stable remotes. For some tests the failure can be waived by a QA user.

UEFI Capsule

Capsule updates should be uploaded with a valid CAPSULE_HEADER that contains a GUID listed in the metainfo.xml file.

For reference, the UEFI capsule header is defined like this:

typedef struct {
EFI_GUID   CapsuleGuid;
UINT32     HeaderSize;
UINT32     Flags;
UINT32     CapsuleImageSize;
} EFI_CAPSULE_HEADER;

If the header is missing or invalid the test will fail, although the failure can be waived by a QA user.

Test failure due to invalid UEFI capsule

DFU

DFU updates must be uploaded with a valid UFD footer that matches the device revision number with a correct CRC value.

Although these can be waived by a QA user, firmware uploaded without a footer can be installed on any DFU device, which makes this unwise.

Test failure due invalid DFU footer

dfu-tool from the fwupd project can convert a raw firmware image to include a DFU header, for example:

$ dfu-tool convert dfu old.raw new.dfu $ dfu-tool set-vendor new.dfu 0xabcd $ dfu-tool set-product new.dfu 0x1234

Blocklist

All update binaries, and shards contained within are scanned for strings which may indicate a problem with the firmware. Example strings are:

  • DO NOT SHIP
  • To Be Defined By O.E.M

Although these can be waived by a QA user, firmware should not be uploaded that have this text.

Test failure due to blocklist detection

Additionally, the blocklist plugin will search for other information that may add a component claim. For instance the computrace claim will be added to any firmware shipping the official Computrace agent, and it will be visible to users when viewing the component information.

Microcode

All UEFI updates are decompressed, and if a processor microcode is found then it is compared with older firmware versions that have been uploaded to the LVFS.

If the microcode has been downgraded then the test will fail, although the failure can be waived by a QA user.

Test failure due to microcode downgrade

PE Check

Any EFI shards are loaded and will have their PE signatures checked. If any certificate is out of date, or otherwise invalid a test failure will appear. This failure can be waived by a QA user.

Test failure due to PE signature being out of date downgrade

End-to-End testing

Embargo remotes

Once the firmware is in an embargo remote anyone in the vendor group can then download the vendor-embargo.conf from the LVFS metadata page and install it locally on their Linux system.

Warning

The vendor-embargo.conf file should never be emailed to anyone not in your vendor group.

If you want to allow access to an ODM or OEM this can be done by transferring the ownership of the firmware.

After waiting a few minutes for the LVFS to regenerate the vendor group metadata, the user can do fwupdmgr refresh to get the new metadata which includes the new firmware release. Once the new metadata is available on the local system the device can be updated either using fwupdmgr update or using GNOME Software.

Note

You can force GNOME Software to update the metadata catalog using the refresh button in the left hand side of the header bar in the Updates panel.

Testing and stable remotes

You should only move stable firmware to testing and stable after completing an end-to-end test with the embargo remote.

Warning

It can take a few hours to regenerate the testing and stable remotes and up to 24 hours for users to download the new metadata catalog. Most vendors see a large spike in downloads the day after they move a firmware to stable, and then a steady decay the days after.

Consider adding a download limit to prevent deploying a firmware to tens of thousands of machines on day 1.

Debugging Metadata

If you’ve moved the firmware to embargo, waited for the remote to regenerate, and then done fwupdmgr refresh and still do not have any update available you can check for the new release in the downloaded metadata using vim:

$ cat /var/lib/fwupd/remotes.d/NAME_OF_VENDOR-embargo/metadata.xml.gz | gunzip | less
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<components origin="lvfs" version="0.9">
  <component type="firmware">
    <id>com.8bitdo.fc30.firmware</id>
    <name>FC30 Device Update</name><requires>
      <id compare="ge" version="0.9.3">org.freedesktop.fwupd</id>
    </requires>
    <screenshots>
      <screenshot type="default">
        <caption>Unplug the controller, hold down L+R+START for 3 seconds until both LEDs are flashing then reconnect the controller.</caption>
        
      </screenshot>
    </screenshots>
    <releases>
      <release timestamp="1520380800" urgency="medium" version="4.10">
        <location>https://fwupd.org/downloads/2999ee63c0cff96893c1614955f505cb4f0fa406-8Bitdo-SFC30_NES30_SFC30_SNES30-4.10.cab</location>
        <checksum type="sha1" filename="2999ee63c0cff96893c1614955f505cb4f0fa406-8Bitdo-SFC30_NES30_SFC30_SNES30-4.10.cab" target="container">a60593fd1dbb40d7174c99f34b5536f45392bf6c</checksum>
        <checksum type="sha1" filename="N30_F30_firmware_V4.10.dat" target="content">f6e4fe9c56585e200b8754d59eb1e761090bd39f</checksum>
        <description>
          <p>Enhanced the stability of the Bluetooth pairing.</p>
        </description>
        <size type="installed">46108</size>
        <size type="download">53407</size>
      </release>
      <release timestamp="1506038400" urgency="medium" version="4.01">
        <location>https://fwupd.org/downloads/fe066b57c69265f4cce8a999a5f8ab90d1c13b24-8Bitdo-SFC30_NES30_SFC30_SNES30-4.01.cab</location>
        <checksum type="sha1" filename="fe066b57c69265f4cce8a999a5f8ab90d1c13b24-8Bitdo-SFC30_NES30_SFC30_SNES30-4.01.cab" target="container">78ef2663beaa952415c3719447b0d2ff43e837d8</checksum>
        <checksum type="sha1" filename="bluetooth_firmware_v4.01.dat" target="content">f6cacd2cbae6936e9630903d73c3ef5722c4745c</checksum>
        <description>
          <p>Fixed input lag problem when used with other controllers.</p>
        </description>
        <size type="installed">45596</size>
        <size type="download">52085</size>
      </release>
    </releases>
    <provides>
      <firmware type="flashed">7934f46a-77cb-5ade-af34-2bd2842ced3d</firmware>
      <firmware type="flashed">7a81a9eb-0922-5774-8803-fbce3ccbcb9e</firmware>
    </provides>
  </component>

Here you can see a lot of information. Some interesting points:

  • The 4.10 and 4.01 .metainfo.xml files have been combined into one <component> using the <id> to combine them.
  • They always share the same set of screenshots
  • They always share the same set of GUIDs
  • They always share the same set of requirements

You can also examine the stable metadata the same way:

$ cat /var/lib/fwupd/remotes.d/lvfs/metadata.xml.gz | gunzip | less

Signed Reports

After each update the fwupdmgr client tools allow the end user to submit a “report” which is used by the firmware owner to validate the firmware deployment is correct. Any failures can be analysed and patterns found and the metadata can be fixed. For instance, the failures might indicate that the required fwupd version needs to be raised to a higher value, or that the update requires a specific bootloader version.

Part of the anonymous report also includes the device checksum which can be used to verify the firmware is being deployed correctly. All users can submit reports, and there is no way to verify the report has not been modified by the end user before submission. This means reports should not be used for trust, and the information only used when statistically significant.

There is provision in fwupd 1.2.6 and newer to actually sign the report contents using a per-machine certificate. This allows the LVFS to verify the report has not been modified after being signed, and also means the LVFS now knows what user submitted the report. If the LVFS knows which user (and thus which vendor) owns which certificate the report can then be used for trusted operations. For instance, setting the “golden” device checksums for the update, or verifying that the firmware was indeed tested on specific hardware.

To do this, the user must add at the certificate from each machine used for testing:

Uploading client certificates

The user can then upload reports to the LVFS in a trusted way by signing the report:

$ fwupdmgr refresh
$ fwupdmgr update
…reboot…
$ fwupdmgr report-history --sign

This is then reflected in the public device pages for vendors that have public accounts:

Showing which QA teams tested the update

Note

The version of fwupd is shown for peripheral updates, and the system DMI information is used for system updates.

Interestingly, this information is also exported into the public metadata, e.g.

<artifacts>
  <artifact type="binary"><testing>
      <test_result date="2021-07-14">
        <vendor_name id="1">LVFS</vendor_name>
        <device>LENOVO ThinkPad X1 Carbon 7th</device>
        <os version="34" variant="workstation">fedora</os>
        <previous_version>1.2.6</previous_version>
        <custom>
          <value key="RuntimeVersion(org.freedesktop.fwupd)">1.6.2</value>
        </custom>
      </test_result>
    </testing>
  </artifact>
</artifacts>

Additionally, the signed report can be made available to 3rd parties, typically as part of a hardware certification program.

Sharing a URL for hardware certification

Note

Sharing the URL allows a user (possibly outside your organization) to read the specific report details but not modify the firmware or report in any way.